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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, based on Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-
103(2)(j) (formerly §78-2a-3(2)(j)), in that this case was transferred to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly grant defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
where plaintiff was fully paid all amounts owing under the policy issued to plaintiff by 
American States Insurance Company, plaintiff never requested any additional coverage prior 
to the loss, and plaintiff specifically rejected any additional coverage? 
2. Did the trial court properly deny plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment, where plaintiff did not request any additional coverage beyond the coverage 
provided by plaintiffs policy with Safeco Insurance Company and plaintiff specifically 
rejected any such coverage? 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court will review the district court's decision 
to grant summary judgment for correctness, affording the trial court no deference. Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust 
v. Turner, 2007 UT 48,164 P.3d 1247. 
Plaintiff preserved these issues on appeal (R.3497-3515). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC, 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Asael Farr & Sons Company ("Farr") has sued various insurance carriers, agents and 
brokers, claiming they did not provide sufficient insurance coverage for damage to Farr's ice 
cream inventory due to contamination as a result of accidental severing of an ammonia line 
on May 29, 2003. At the time of the damage, Farr was insured under a policy issued by 
American States Insurance Company which had undisputed coverage limits for this loss of 
$25,000.00. Farr claims, however, that various agents and brokers should have provided 
higher coverage, even though Farr did not request, and specifically rejected, such higher 
coverage. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
After extensive discovery, all defendants filed motions for summary judgment and 
Farr filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court, in a detailed and 
thoroughly reasoned decision, granted all defendants' motions for summary judgment and 
denied Farr's motion for partial summary judgment. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The "Statement of Facts" in Farr's brief is filled with misstatements of the evidence 
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and references to portions of the record which are in fact attorney argument, rather than any 
admissible evidence. The undisputed, uncontroverted facts on which the court relied in 
granting summary judgment to defendants are as follows: 
Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Company ("Farr") is a Utah corporation engaged in the 
business of manufacturing and distributing ice cream products (Duane Farr Depo. pp. 10-11, 
R.1671-72). On May 29, 2003, at Farr's cold storage warehouse in Salt Lake City, Utah, a 
condenser fan accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line, causing 
ammonia contamination of Farr's ice cream products stored in the warehouse. (Duane Farr 
Depo. pp. 89-90, R. 1720-21). Farr claims damages to its ice cream products as a result of 
the incident of more than $1,500,000.00. (Third Amended Complaint 1127, R. 936). 
At the time of the accident, Farr was insured under a policy with American States 
Insurance Company, a member of the Safeco Group, which provided various coverages, 
including equipment breakdown coverage with limits of $25,000.00, the limit which would 
apply to ammonia contamination of the ice cream products in Farr's warehouse. (Policy, R. 
1175, 1225-29). American States paid Farr its limits of $25,000.00 (Payment letter, R. 
1470). Farr then filed this lawsuit against various insurance carriers, agents and brokers, 
alleging breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, and promissory estoppel, for failing to 
provide higher limits of coverage. (Third Amended Complaint, R. 927+). 
During the year prior to the accident, from May 14, 2002, until May 14, 2003, Farr 
was insured under an insurance policy issued by Unitrin Property and Casualty Group 
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("Unitrin"). (Policy, R. 947-1080; Duane Farr Depo. p. 40, R. 1088). The Unitrin policy 
provided equipment breakdown coverage for loss of perishable goods due to contamination 
with limits of $25,000.00, the same limits as the American States policy which was in effect 
at the time of the accident. (Policy, R. 966,986-91; Duane Farr Depo. pp. 43-44, R.1091-92). 
In March of 2003, Unitrin's subsidiary, Trinity Universal Insurance, notified Farr that its 
policy would not be renewed beyond the expiration date of May 14,2003. (Notice, R. 1365; 
Duane Farr Depo. p. 45, R. 1093). 
After receiving notice of Unitrin's intention to non-renew its policy, Farr contacted 
insurance agent Andrew L. Reed ("Reed"). (Duane Farr. Depo. pp. 48-49, R. 1692-93). Mr. 
Reed is a captive agent of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, meaning that if a 
member of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies is willing to write coverage for a 
particular insured, Mr. Reed is required to write that coverage with the member of the 
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, but if Farmers is not willing to write such coverage, 
Mr. Reed is free to write the coverage with any other insurance carrier which is willing to 
write the policy (Reed Depo. pp. 53, 125, R. 1124, 1822). Farr provided Reed with 
information about the coverages and limits of the expiring Unitrin policy and informed Reed 
that Farr wanted to compare "apples to apples" in obtaining another policy. (Duane Farr 
Depo. pp. 141-42, R. 3146). The information provided by Farr included a document showing 
that the Unitrin policy had coverage of $25,000.00 for loss of perishable goods due to 
equipment breakdown. (Duane Farr Depo pp. 141-42, R. 3146). 
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The general manager of Farr, Dexter Farr (also known as Duane Farr) admits that 
during his meetings with Reed, Reed suggested an increase in the limit of "spoilage 
coverage" for loss of perishable goods due to equipment breakdown, but that Dexter Farr 
rejected any such proposed increase above the coverage limit that had been in place during 
the previous year (Dexter Farr Depo. pp. 102-103, R. 3145). 
Reed submitted Fair's request for coverage to Truck Insurance Exchange, a member 
of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, but Truck Insurance Exchange declined 
coverage for Farr, so Reed began contacting other agents and insurers to try to find another 
insurance carrier which would write a policy for Farr (Reed Depo. pp. 97-98, 213, R. 1130-
32). Dexter Farr admits that, at least as of May 23, 2003, he knew that Farmers Insurance 
had declined to write the requested coverage. (Dexter Farr Depo. pp. 158,159,179, R. 1738-
39, 1744). 
Since Truck Insurance Exchange had declined to write coverage for Farr, in March 
of 2003, Reed contacted Steven Kirchen ("Kirchen") of Central Bonds and Insurance 
Agency, Inc. ("Central Bonds") (Reed Depo. pp. 187-91, R. 779-83; Kirchen Depo. p. 21, 
R. 1842). At Reed's request, Kirchen contacted other agents and insurers and obtained a bid 
from Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners") (Kirchen Depo. pp. 25-26, 28, R. 
1846-47, 1849). Auto Owners' bid provided, however, that issuance of a policy by Auto 
Owners was subject to office approval and receiving additional information regarding Farr's 
loss history and property valuations (Kirchen Depo. pp. 30-31, R. 1850-51). 
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On May 14,2003, Farr delivered a check in the sum of $7,838.83 to Auto Owners for 
insurance coverage. (Duane Farr Depo. p. 81, R. 1713). Shortly thereafter, Auto Owner's 
underwriting department declined coverage for Farr and returned Fair's uncashed check. 
(Kirchen Depo. p. 47, R. 1861). 
Since Auto Owners had declined coverage for Farr, on May 23, 2003, Kirchen put 
Reed in contact with Troy Granger of Trustco, Inc. ("Trustco"), an insurance broker. 
(Granger Depo. p. 16, R. 839). On instructions from Reed, Farr appointed Trustco as its 
broker of record, giving Trustco the authority to handle matters associated with writing the 
Farr policy (Duane Farr Depo. pp. 84-86, R. 1110-12; Broker letter, R. 1165). Trustco 
contacted American States, an affiliate of Safeco Insurance Company ("Safeco") and 
American States issued Farr a policy with effective dates from May 23, 2003 to May 23, 
2004. (Policy, R. 1167-1316; Granger Depo p. 31, R. 1878). The American States policy 
contained the same coverage and limits for loss of perishable property due to equipment 
breakdown as Farr's previous policy with Unitrin, $25,000.00 limits (Policy, R. 1175,1225-
29). 
On May 29, 2004, the accident occurred, resulting in ammonia contamination of the 
ice cream products in Farr's warehouse. (Duane Farr Depo pp. 10-11, R. 1720-21). 
After determining that the coverage under the American States policy was insufficient 
to cover the damages to Farr's ice cream inventory as a result of the ammonia contamination, 
Farr filed this lawsuit against fifteen insurance carriers, agents and brokers, claiming breach 
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of contract, bad faith, negligence and promissory estoppel. (Third Complaint, R. 927+). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While defendant Andrew L. Reed was a "captive agent" of the Farmers Insurance 
Group of Companies, the evidence is uncontroverted that defendant Truck Insurance 
Exchange, a member of the Farmers Group, declined coverage for Farr and that Reed was 
free to write coverage with any other insurance carrier which would accept the coverage for 
Farr. The evidence is further uncontroverted that Farr was aware prior to the accident that 
Truck Insurance Exchange had declined coverage and that the coverage was written with 
American States Insurance Company, a member of the Safeco Group. Therefore, there is no 
basis for plaintiffs claims against defendant Truck Insurance Exchange. 
There also is no basis for plaintiffs claims against defendant Andrew L. Reed. The 
evidence is uncontroverted that Reed arranged, through defendant Trustco, to obtain for Farr 
the very thing Farr had requested, i.e. a replacement policy with American States which 
contained essentially the same coverage and limits as those in Fair's previous policy with 
Unitrin. The evidence is further uncontroverted that Reed specifically suggested an increase 
in the spoilage coverage limit, but Farr rejected that suggestion and insisted on the same 
coverage as under the Unitrin policy. There simply is no basis for Farr's claims that Reed 
had a duty to obtain other coverage than the coverage which was included in the American 
States policy. 
Even if Farr had not specifically rejected the additional limits of spoilage coverage 
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recommended by Mr. Reed, Farr would have no cause of action against Mr. Reed under Utah 
law for failure to provide higher limits of coverage. Under Utah law, there can be no 
contract of insurance based upon communications between an agent and the insured unless 
there is a meeting of the minds between the insured and the agent of all of the essential 
elements to the insurance contract, including the types of risks to be covered, the amount of 
indemnity, the duration of coverage or the premium. Harris v. Albrecht 2004 UT13,86 P.3d 
728. This is especially true in the area of commercial business insurance, where a great deal 
of customization of coverage is required as opposed to the more standardized automobile 
insurance policies. It is further well established under Utah law that an agent has no duty to 
procure insurance unless the agent has "definite directions from the insured to consummate 
a final contract." (Id.). Defendant Reed clearly provided all insurance coverage requested 
by Farr and even went further, suggesting additional coverage which Farr rejected. 
Defendant Reed clearly met all of his duties to Farr under Utah law and there is no basis for 
Fair's claims against Reed. 
Farr's argument that Farr should be entitled to additional coverage for contamination 
of their ice cream inventory beyond the coverage under the American States policy is 
essentially an argument that the policy did not meet Farr's "reasonable expectations," and, 
therefore, Farr should be entitled to recover additional amounts from the defendants up to 
those "reasonable expectations." This argument has been specifically rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 839 P.2d 
8 
798 (Utah 1992). 
The uncontroverted evidence clearly establishes that defendant Reed specifically 
advised Farr to increase the spoilage coverage under their policy, but Farr rejected that 
advice. Even if Reed had not made such recommendation, however, there are no Utah cases 
which have held that an agent can be liable for negligent failure to advise the insured to 
obtain other coverage and the cases of other jurisdictions have rejected any such claim, 
absent a "special relationship" with the insured. There is no such "special relationship" 
between defendant Reed and Farr. 
There is no evidence of any misrepresentation or misstatement regarding the coverage 
under the American States policy by defendant Reed. To the contrary, the evidence is 
undisputed that Reed provided exactly the coverage which was requested by Farr and even 
suggested additional spoilage coverage, which was rejected by Farr. 
Since the uncontroverted facts do no provide any basis for any of the plaintiffs claims 
for either Truck Insurance Exchange or Andrew L. Reed, the district court properly granted 
summary judgment to these defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE. 
While defendant Andrew L. Reed was a "captive agent" of the Farmers Insurance 
Group of Companies, of which Truck Insurance Exchange is a member, the evidence is 
9 
undisputed that Truck Insurance Exchange declined coverage for Farr and that Farr was 
aware that Truck Insurance Exchange had declined coverage before the accident at Farr's 
warehouse. Since Truck Insurance Exchange had declined coverage, Reed was free to obtain 
coverage with any other insurance carrier and, through Trustco, he obtained that coverage 
with American States. Farr admits that Farr did not have any contract with Truck Insurance 
Exchange and there is no evidence that Reed was acting as an agent of Truck Insurance 
Exchange in dealing with other insurers or obtaining coverage for Farr with other insurers. 
Since there is no basis for any claims against Truck Insurance Exchange, the district court 
properly granted summary judgment to Truck Insurance Exchange. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO ANDREW L. REED, 
A. An Insurance Agent Has No Duty to Provide Coverage Which the Insured Has 
Not Requested, Particularly Where the Insured Has Specifically Rejected Such 
Coverage. 
The uncontroverted evidence is that Farr came to defendant Reed after its insurance 
carrier, Unitrin, had advised Farr that it would not renew Farr's insurance policy at the end 
of the policy term. Farr gave Reed information about the coverages and limits of the expiring 
Unitrin policy and said that in shopping for other policies, Farr wanted to compare "apples 
to apples." When Reed reviewed Farr's coverages and limits with Unitrin he recommended 
that Farr increase their spoilage coverage limit of $25,000.00, but Farr rejected the suggested 
increase, insisting on the same coverage as under the Unitrin policy. Even if Reed had any 
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duty to advise Farr to obtain higher limits of spoilage coverage, which he did not, he clearly 
satisfied that duty by recommending higher coverage and having Farr reject his 
recommendation. 
Farr claims that in spite of the fact that the American States policy had the same limits 
of coverage as Fair's previous policy with Unitrin, and in spite of the fact that Farr rejected 
Reed's recommendation that Fair obtain higher limits of spoilage coverage, Reed should 
have anticipated "all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of plaintiffs 
significant insurable risks," and should have insisted that Farr obtain higher limits of spoilage 
coverage than it had under its previous policy with Unitrin. 
Farr's argument is similar to the argument raised by the plaintiff in Harris v. Albrecht 
2004 UT 13, 86 P.3d 728. In Harris, the plaintiff brought an action against his insurance 
agent and insurer for breach of contract and negligent failure to procure insurance before a 
fire destroyed the plaintiffs business. The plaintiff claimed that, several months before the 
fire, he had contacted the defendant insurance agent to obtain business insurance for his 
architectural firm. The plaintiff claimed that he told the agent "to place the business and fire 
coverage on his equipment and the contents of his office," and that the agent said, "he would 
take care of it," and "he would come out and look at the equipment." (Id. at 730). Based on 
those facts, the plaintiff alleged that the agent had entered into a contract to procure the 
needed insurance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant agent 
and insurer. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment, but the Utah 
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Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, concluding that: 
[N]o contract of insurance existed between Harris and Albrecht. 
They did not discuss any of the elements essential to an 
insurance contract except that Harris "wanted business and fire 
coverage on [the] equipment and contents" of his architectural 
business. There was no mention, except fire, of the types of 
risks Harris wanted covered, the amount of indemnity, the 
duration of coverage, or the premium. Therefore, there was no 
meeting of the minds on which to base a contract of insurance. 
(Id. at 731). The court also noted that a general request does not give an agent authority— 
it needs to be explicit instructions: 
Additionally, Harris failed to give authority for Albrecht 
to ascertain some of the essential facts. He merely made a 
general request for insurance, which falls short of giving 
Albrecht authority. Harris was required to give explicit 
instructions to Albrecht rather than make a blanket request for 
insurance. Giving authority to the agent requires more than such 
a blanket request. 
(id at 732). 
In the present case, Farr alleges that it expected Reed to procure "all necessary 
coverage for its significant insurable risks." However, the only request made by Farr was for 
insurance coverages and limits as closely matched as possible to those contained in the prior 
policy with Unitrin. The only discussion between Farr and Reed regarding spoilage coverage 
was Reed's suggestion, and Fair's rejection, of a higher limit on that coverage. Farr never 
made a request for increased coverage on the spoilage of inventory. Fair's alleged general 
request for "adequate coverage of all significant insurable risks," is certainly insufficient to 
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establish any contract or commitment on the part of Reed to unilaterally procure an insurance 
policy for Farr containing coverage for contamination of inventory at a level more than fifty 
times the limit that had been in place the previous year, particularly where Farr specifically 
rejected such coverage. 
Farr seems to take the position that the more general and vague its request for 
insurance coverage, the broader the duty of defendant Reed to procure all possible coverages. 
However, this would go directly against the Utah Supreme Court's holdings and opinions 
expressed in the Harris decision: 
The expression of a desire to procure business insurance 
followed by an oral affirmation of that desire is not enough to 
create a contract to procure insurance. Creation of a contract to 
procure insurance requires that the agent know or have ready 
access to the information needed to procure the insurance or be 
able to imply the terms from prior dealings. If the insured gives 
authority to the agent to obtain some information, he must do so 
explicitly. 
Harris v. Albrecht 86 P.3d at 732. The court also noted that, 
A significant distinction exists between business 
insurance policies and personal insurance policies. The ease of 
procuring an auto or homeowner's policy contrasts sharply with 
the customization required for a business policy. . . . The 
information available to Albrecht at the time of the telephone 
conversation did not provide the essential elements needed to 
create an insurance contract. 
(Id at 733). 
The Harris case further held that an agent does not have a duty to procure insurance 
unless the agent has "definite directions from the insured to consummate a final contract." 
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(Id. at 731). The uncontroverted facts establish that Reed obtained a policy of insurance 
containing coverage similar to Farr's prior policy with Unitrin, pursuant to Fair's 
instructions, and that Farr did not provide any specific direction to Reed to obtain additional 
coverage beyond the previous coverage with Unitrin. To the contrary, the uncontroverted 
evidence establishes that Farr specifically rejected Reed's suggestion to increase inventory 
spoilage coverage. There clearly was neither a contract nor a commitment on the part of 
Reed to unilaterally procure an insurance policy for Farr which contained coverage beyond 
Farr's specifications. 
B, Utah Law Does Not Recognize the Doctrine of "Reasonable Expectations." 
Farr's argument that Reed or the other defendants should be liable for failure to 
provide insurance coverage for contamination of inventory beyond the policy limits of 
$25,000.00 is essentially an argument that Farr's policy with American States, which was in 
effect at the time of the loss, did not meet Farr's "reasonable expectations" of coverage. The 
doctrine of "reasonable expectations" has been specifically rejected by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
In Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 
1992), Mr. Allen accidentally injured his son when he spilled boiling water. Mr. and Mrs. 
Allen had a homeowners policy with Prudential which provided liability insurance coverage 
but contained a "household exclusion," which excluded coverage for injuries to a member 
of the insured's household. Mr. and Mrs. Allen sued Prudential, arguing that the court 
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should invalidate the "household exclusion" of the policy because it did not meet Mr. and 
Mrs. Allen's "reasonable expectations" of coverage under the policy. Similar to Farr's 
argument against defendant Reed, Mr. and Mrs. Allen alleged that the agent knew or should 
have known that Mr. Allen expected the policy to cover injuries to "anyone," and that the 
Aliens had a reasonable expectation that they would be covered with liability coverage under 
the Prudential policy for injuries to family members. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the Aliens' arguments and specifically rejected the 
doctrine of "reasonable expectations." The court stated: 
In making this argument, Allen asks us to accept a 
doctrine that considerably modifies the legislatively expressed 
public policy underlying the regulation of the insurance industry. 
The theory she advances essentially will allow a court to 
invalidate a clear provision of an insurance contract, even if the 
insured had not read it, if the finder of fact is convinced that the 
insurer's agent knew or should have known that the insured had 
expectations that contradicted the policy's language and that the 
agent created or helped to create those expectations. For the 
reasons set forth below, we decline to make such a change in 
Utah law. 
(Id at 804). 
Since the Utah Supreme Court has specifically rejected the doctrine of "reasonable 
expectations," Farr cannot argue that defendant Reed or any of the other defendants should 
be liable for contamination of inventory coverage beyond the $25,000.00 limit of the 
American States policy because Farr reasonably expected that higher coverage would be 
provided. This is particularly true where the limits for contamination of inventory coverage 
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under the American States policy were the same limits as the coverage under Fair's previous 
policy with Unitrin and where Farr specifically rejected any additional limits of coverage for 
contamination of inventory. 
C. Reed Cannot Be Liable for Negligent Failure to Advise Farr to Obtain Other 
Coverage. 
Under Utah law, an agent's duty is to provide the insurance coverage which is 
specifically requested by the insured. Harris v. Albrecht supra. These defendants are not 
aware of any Utah case which has held that an insurance agent can be liable for failure to 
advise the insured to obtain other coverage. The courts of other jurisdictions which have 
addressed the issue have consistently held that an agent cannot be liable for negligent failure 
to advise the insured to obtain other coverage, absent a "special relationship" with the 
insured. In Fitzpatrick v. Hayes. 57 Cal. App. 4th 916, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (1997), Mrs. 
Fitzpatrick was injured in an automobile accident caused by an underinsured motorist. Mrs. 
Fitzpatrick collected the limits under the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy and the 
underinsured motorist limits under her own policy with State Farm. Mrs. Fitzpatrick and her 
husband then brought suit against the State Farm agent and State Farm, alleging that the 
agent negligently failed to advise Mr. and Mrs. Fitzpatrick to obtain a "personal umbrella" 
policy offered by State Farm which would have provided $1,000,000.00 in underinsured 
motorist coverage for a small additional premium. The Fitzpatrick's contended that the agent 
had knowledge concerning their financial situation and insurance needs, and the agent should 
have provided the additional coverage. They also filed an affidavit of a former State Farm 
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agent who stated that the Fitzpatrick's agent did not meet the standard of care applicable to 
State Farm agents in his dealings with Mr. and Mrs. Fitzpatrick. 
The California Court of Appeals rejected Mr. and Mrs. Fitzpatrick's claims against 
both the agent and State Farm for negligent failure to provide other insurance coverage. The 
court held that the agent had no fiduciary duty to the Fitzpatricks to provide any particular 
type of insurance, to advise them of the availability of other coverage or to advise them of 
any inadequacies in the insurance policy which they obtained. 
In the present case, there is no evidence of any "special relationship," between 
defendant Reed and Farr which could create any obligation on the part of Mr. Reed to advise 
Farr regarding other insurance coverage which may be available. Even if there were any 
such special relationship, however, the evidence is clear that Farr insisted on the same 
coverage which Farr had under its previous policy with Unitrin and that Farr rejected 
defendant Reed's suggestion that they obtain higher limits of coverage for spoilage of 
inventory. Under Utah law and the cases of other jurisdictions, there clearly is no basis for 
Fair's claims that defendant Reed breached any duty to Farr to recommend other coverage. 
D. The Cases Cited By Farr Are Not In Point. 
Farr cites Youngblood v. Auto Owners Insurance Company, 2007 UT 28, 158 P.3d 
1088, for the proposition that Reed had duties to Farr to provide coverage other than the 
coverage requested by Farr. In Youngblood, the court held that where the agent specifically 
misrepresented that a policy issued to Mr. Youngblood's business would cover Mr. 
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Youngblood if he were struck as a pedestrian by an uninsured motorist, Auto Owners 
Insurance Company would be estopped to deny coverage for underinsured motorist benefits 
when Mr. Youngblood was struck by an underinsured motorist under the very circumstances 
which the agent said would be covered. Unlike the Youngblood case, in the present case 
there is no allegation or evidence of any misrepresentations by defendant Reed concerning 
the coverages under Farr's policy with American States Insurance Company. To the 
contrary, the policy contains exactly the same coverage which was requested by Farr, i.e. the 
same coverage as the coverage under Fair's previous policy with Unitrin, and Farr 
specifically rejected higher limits of coverage for inventory spoliation which were 
recommended by Mr. Reed. The Youngblood case clearly does not provide any basis for 
claims of estoppel against Mr. Reed. 
Farr also cites the cases of Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1985), and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez. 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983), for the 
proposition that the court will not enforce provisions of a policy which have not been 
communicated to the insured. Neither of these cases is applicable, since Farr clearly 
communicated to Mr. Reed that Farr wanted the same coverage as the coverage under Farr's 
previous policy with Unitrin and Farr received the same coverage in the policy with 
American States which was in force at the time of the accident. Farr further specifically 
rejected the higher coverage for contamination of inventory which Farr seeks to recover in 
this action. 
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Based on the well established law of the State of Utah, as discussed above, the 
undisputed facts clearly establish that Farr has no cause of action against Defendant Reed for 
the claims alleged by Farr and that the court properly granted Reed's motion for summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts clearly establish that defendant Truck Insurance Exchange 
declined coverage for Farr, that Farr was informed prior to the accident that Truck Insurance 
Exchange had declined coverage, and that defendant Reed was not acting as an agent of 
defendant Truck Insurance Exchange in seeking to obtain other coverage for Farr after Truck 
Insurance Exchange declined coverage. Therefore, the district court properly granted 
summary judgment to Truck Insurance Exchange. The uncontroverted evidence further 
clearly establishes that defendant Reed, through Trustco, provided all coverage requested by 
Farr in the policy issued by American States, and that Farr specifically rejected any higher 
limits of coverage for spoilage of inventory. Under Utah law, defendant Reed had no duty 
to provide coverage other than the coverage specifically requested by Farr, and he had no 
duty to advise Farr to obtain higher limits of coverage which was specifically rejected by 
Farr. Defendants Truck Insurance Exchange and Andrew L. Reed, therefore, respectfully 
submit that the trial court's order granting summary judgment to these defendants should be 
affirmed. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTWENT-




TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
reciprocal or'inter-insurance 
exchange; ANDREW L. REED; 
TRUSTCO, INC., a corporation; 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation; AMERICAN STATES 
INSURANCE CO., a corporation; 
HARTFORD STEAM BOILER 
INSPECTION AND INSURANCE CO., a 
corporation; STEPHEN D. KIRCHEN; 
CENTRAL BONDS & INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., a corporation; 
CENTRAL BONDS AND INSURANCE 
COMPANY INCORPORATED, a 
corporation; AUTO-OWNERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation; BLACKBURN JONES 
COMPANY, a corporation; E. KENT 
JONES; TRINITY UNIVERSAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF KANSAS, 
INC., a corporation; TRINITY 
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE CO., a 
corporation; and UNITRIN PROPERTY 
& CASUALTY INSURANCE GROUP, a 
corporation or common enterprise, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 040913675 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
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On May 4, 2007, the Court heard oral arguments on: (1) Defendant Hartford Steam 
Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) 
Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of America and American States Insurance 
Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; and (3) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment against defendants Hartford and Safeco. 
On May 7, 2007, the Court heard oral arguments on the remaining motions, 
including: (1) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint; 
(2) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On Apportionment; (3) 
Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Safeco 
Insurance Company, American States Insurance Co., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and 
Insurance Co., Andrew L. Reed, and Trustco Inc. On Liability Issues; (4) Defendant Auto 
Owners Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; (5) Defendant Trustco's 
Motion For Summary Judgment; (6) Defendants Stephen D. Kirchen, Central Bonds & 
Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance Company Incorporated's Motion 
For Summary Judgment; and (7) Defendants Truck Insurance Exchange and Andrew 
Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the May 7th hearing the Court 
took all matters under advisement except for plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on 
apportionment which the Court indicated it would reserve until, if necessary, the time of 
trial. 
Having thoroughly reviewed the parties' briefing, arguments and relevant legal 
authorities, the Court now rules as stated herein. 
I. Background 
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This case contains a somewhat lengthy and relatively complex factual background. 
For that reason, a brief synopsis of the undisputed facts is warranted. 
Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Company ("Farr") is a locally based ice cream 
manufacturer and distributor in operation since incorporation in 1920. Farr's current lawsuit 
stems from an incident which occurred on May 29, 2003, at the company's cold storage 
warehouse located in Salt Lake City, Utah. On that date an electric condenser fan 
accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line, thereby releasing 
ammonia and contaminating plaintiffs product stored at the warehouse. As of November 
7, 2003, Farr calculated damages exceeding $1,500,000.00. 
Immediately after the accident, Farr notified its insurer, American States Insurance 
Company ("American States"), of the loss. Pursuant to the Equipment Breakdown 
Coverage portion of the policy, American States paid Farr $25,000.00—the policy limit for 
ammonia contamination. Finding coverage insufficient for the loss suffered, Farr filed its 
current action against the fifteen named defendants alleging causes of action against each 
for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, and promissory estoppel. 
From May 14, 2002, to May 14, 2003, Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Farr was insured 
for commercial property and liability insurance through Unitrin Property & Casualty Group 
("Unitrin"). In March 2003, Unitrin's subsidiary, Trinity Universal Insurance, advised Farr 
that its policy would not be renewed beyond the expiration date. Under Farr's Unitrin policy 
Equipment Breakdown Coverage for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination 
was subject to a $25,000 liability limit. 
Upon learning of Unitrin's non-renewal, Farr began working with its insurance agent 
Andrew Reed ("Reed"), a captive agent of Truckers Insurance Exchange/Farmers 
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Insurance Group ("Farmers"), in order to obtain comprehensive property and liability 
coverage. Thereafter, Farmers' declined coverage on the Farr policy, and Reed began 
contacting other agents and insurers. In March 2003, Reed contacted Steven Kirchen 
("Kirchen") of Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Central Bonds"). At Reed's 
request, Kirchen contacted other agents and insurers and eventually obtained a bid from 
Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners"). Auto Owners indicated, however, that 
any writing on the Farr policy was subject to office approval and additional insurer 
information on items such as loss history and property valuations. 
On May 14, 2003, Farr delivered a check to Auto Owners in the amount of 
$7,838.83 for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverages. Shortly thereafter, 
Auto Owners' underwriting department declined coverage on the Farr account and returned 
the Farr's uncashed check. 
On May 23, 2003, in a continued attempt to obtain coverage, Kirchen put Reed in 
contact with Troy Granger of Trustco Inc. ("Trustco"). Relying upon Reed's instructions, 
Farr appointed Trustco as its Broker of Record, thereby giving Trustco the authority 
necessary to handle affairs associated with writing the Farr policy. Shortly thereafter, 
Trustco placed Farr's coverage with American States, an affiliate of Safeco Insurance 
Company ("Safeco") and American States/Safeco issued Farr a policy active from May 23, 
2003 to May 23, 2004. 
A short six days later, on May 29, 2004, the ammonia accident occurred at the Farr 
warehouse. 
On May 31,2005, Farr filed its Third Amended Complaint against Andrew Reed and 
a group Farr labeled as "Primary Defendants," consisting of: Truckers' Insurance 
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Exchange, Trustco, Safeco, American States Insurance, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
and Insurance Co., Steve Kirchen, Central Bonds and Insurance Incorporated and Auto 
Owners Insurance. Each of Farr's causes of action stem from the so-called "Reed's 
Commitment" in which Farr alleges that Reed bound the primary defendants for all of Farr's 
insurable risks. Specifically, Farr claims on and before May 14, 2003, Andrew Reed, 
while acting both for himself and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, 
Trustco, Safeco, American, Hartford, Kirchen, Central Agency, 
Central Bonds and Auto Owners ("Primary Defendants") had received 
payment for and affirmatively represented to plaintiff: (a) that 
the Primary Defendants had duly bound and provided plaintiff with all 
necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of plaintiffs 
significant insurable risks, including all insurable risks related to Plaintiff's 
Products, and (b) that the Primary Defendants, and each, of them had 
agreed, committed, and become jointly obligated to provide plaintiff 
with all such necessary, available and appropriate insurance 
coverage for all of Plaintiffs Products and all of plaintiffs significant 
insurable risks ("Reeds Commitment") effective May 14, 2003. 
Third Amended Complaint, fl 21. 
II. Pending Motions 
A. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint 
Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to join Travelers 
Indemnity Company/Travelers Boiler Express ("Travelers") as a party to this action. In 
support of its motion, Farr contends that through discovery and the deposition of Stephen 
Kirchen, Farr learned that Travelers bound insurance coverage for all or a portion of the 
damages for which it seeks relief. Defendants, Auto Owners Insurance Company, Stephen 
Kirchen, Central Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc. and Central Bonds And Insurance 
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Company Incorporated oppose amendment, arguing that adding Travelers as a party 
would be futile. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be "freely 
given when justice so requires." Justice, however, does not require that leave be given 
"if doing so would be futile." IHC v Jensen 2003 UT 51, K 139, 82 P.3d 1076, citing, 
Benton v Adams 56 P.3d 81, 86 (Colo 2002) (internal citations omitted)). 
A reading of Stephen Kirchen's deposition, reveals that Kirchen did not represent 
that Travelers bound coverage. Instead, Kirchen testified that Travelers had merely issued 
a spoilage and equipment breakdown quote which was contingent upon Farr's submission 
of additional information (e.g. mortgages, loss payees, address/contact names for 
inspection). Stephen Kirchen Deposition, at 66-67. None of the additional information 
was ever provided. Moreover, Travelers' quote was a supplement to a potential policy from 
Auto Owners. Kirchen Deposition at 66. As a result, when Auto-Owners declined to write 
coverage for Farr, the Travelers portion of the proposed coverage was declined as well. 
Kirchen Deposition at 68. 
Concluding that Kirchen's testimony does not support plaintiffs assertion that 
Travelers bound Farr's coverage, the Court finds that amendment would be futile and 
denies plaintiff's Motion To Amend. Accordingly, Farr's Third Amended Complaint shall 
be the operative complaint for consideration of all remaining motions and to that extent the 
Court will not address Farr's "new" claims involving allegations of an oral binder and policy 
ambiguity. 
B. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Hartford 
And Defendant Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co.'s 
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Motion For Summary Judgment 
On December 31, 2000, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company 
("Hartford") entered into a reinsurance agreement with Safeco Insurance Company of 
America ("Safeco"), under which Hartford agreed to reinsure 100% of the Equipment 
Breakdown liability policies issued by Safeco and its affiliates. At the time of the ammonia 
accident at Farr's storage warehouse, American States, an affiliate of Safeco, was Farr's 
insurer. Apparently in its role as reinsurer for Safeco, Farr now brings claims against 
Hartford for breach of contract, negligence, bad faith and equitable estoppel. The basis 
for each of Farr's causes of action is "Reed's Commitment"—the claim that Andrew Reed, 
while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Hartford, represented to plaintiff that Hartford 
bound coverage for all of Farr's products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint 
at H 21. 
Farr has no contractual relationship with Hartford. As a result, all of Farr's causes 
of action against defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship between Reed and 
Hartford under which Reed, as Hartford's agent, acted on behalf of and subject to 
Hartford's control. Despite Farr's theory, the record contains no evidence of an agency 
relationship between Reed and Hartford. To be an agent, a person "must be authorized 
by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his control.'" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of 
Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998) (citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency §1 
(1958)). Here, it is undisputed that Andrew Reed was a captive agent of the Farmers 
Group of Insurance Companies, and not an employee of Hartford. Andrew Reed 
Deposition, at 397-98. Moreover, Andrew Reed specifically testified that he did not have 
an agency contract with Hartford and did not have any authority to act on Hartford's behalf. 
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Reed Deposition, at 398. Absent evidence of an agency relationship, Farr's claims against 
Hartford for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all fail. 
Accordingly, Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Hartford is 
denied and Hartford's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
C. Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Kirchen and Central 
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance 
Company Incorporated And Defendants Stephen Kirchen, Central 
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance 
Company Incorporated^ Motion For Summary Judgment 
As an initial matter, in its opposition to defendants' motion, Farr fails to effectively 
dispute and support with contrary evidence defendant Central Bonds and Insurance 
Company Incorporated's claim that it had no involvement in the events at issue in this 
litigation. Accordingly, defendant Central Bonds and Insurance Company Inc.'s Motion For 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
Defendant Stephen Kirchen ("Kirchen") was employed as an insurance agent by 
defendant Central Bonds and Insurance Agency ("Central Bonds"). Sometime in March 
2003, Andrew Reed contacted Kirchen and requested his assistance in placing the Farr 
account . At Reed's request, Kirchen contacted several insurance companies including 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company. After Auto Owners' declined Farr's coverage, Kirchen 
put Reed in touch with Trustco Insurance Inc. and its agent Troy Granger. Thereafter, 
Kirchen and Central Bonds had no further involvement with the Farr account. 
The basis for each of Farr's causes of action against Kirchen and Central Bonds is 
"Reed's Commitment'-the claim that Andrew Reed , while acting as the "duly authorized 
agent" for Kirchen and Central Bonds, represented to Farr that Central Bonds, by and 
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through Kirchen, bound coverage for all of Farr's products and insurable risks. Third 
Amended Complaint, at U 21. 
Farr has no contractual relationship with Kirchen or Central Bonds. Consequently, 
all of Farr's causes of action against defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship 
between Reed and Kirchen and Reed and Central Bonds, under which Reed, as 
defendants' agent, acted on their behalf and subject to Kirchen and Central Bonds' control. 
Contrary to plaintiff's theory, the record contains no evidence of an agency relationship 
between Reed and Kirchen and Reed and Hartford. There is, however, no evidence of an 
agency relationship between Reed and Kirchen or Reed and Central Bonds. To be an 
agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his 
control"1 Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998)( citing, 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Here, to the contrary, Reed expressly 
denies that he was an agent of either Kirchen or Central Bonds. Second Andrew Reed 
Deposition, at 399-400. Absent evidence of an agency relationship, Farr's claims against 
Kirchen and Central Bonds for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all 
fail. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment against defendants Kirchen 
and Central Bonds is denied and Central Bonds' and Kirchen's Motion For Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
D. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Safeco 
Insurance Company and American States Insurance Company & 
Defendants Safeco Insurance Company and American States Insurance 
Company's Motion For Summary Judgment 
While attempting to place Farr's coverage, Andrew Reed contacted Troy Granger 
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of defendant Trustco, Inc ("Trustco"). On May 23,2003, Trustco successfully bound Farr's 
property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage with Safeco/American States 
Insurance ("American States") through a policy active from May 23, 2003, through May 23, 
2004. Six days later, on May 29, 2003, the ammonia accident occurred at the Farr 
warehouse. 
Farr's American States policy contained a $25,000.00 Equipment Breakdown 
Coverage provision for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination from the release 
of ammonia. Consequently, after the ammonia leak at Farr cold storage warehouse, 
American States paid Farr the policy limit. 
The basis for each of Farr's causes of action against American States is "Reed's 
Commitment"-the claim that Andrew Reed, while acting as the "duly authorized agent" for 
* American States represented that American States bound coverage on all of plaintiffs 
products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint, at fl 21. 
In Utah, in order to be an agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on 
his behalf and subject to his control.'" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 
1269 (Utah 1989) {citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)) . Here, it is 
undisputed that Reed was not authorized to act on behalf of American States. Andrew 
Reed Deposition at 519-520. Reed had no authority to bind American States and could 
not act as an agent on behalf of American States. Absent any such relationship, plaintiffs 
breach of contract, negligence, bad faith, and estoppel claims fail. 
As Farr's actual insurer, it is important to note that plaintiff does state what duty it 
asserts as the basis for its negligence claim. However, there is no authority in support of 
Farr's claim that an insurance company, absent some specific directive, has an obligation 
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to evaluate and ascertain the insurable risks of each insured. Finally, as to Farr's estoppel 
claim, despite absence of any agency relationship with Reed, there is no evidence that 
American States made an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the coverage it 
ultimately provided to the Farrs. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is denied and Defendants 
Safeco/American States' Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
E. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Auto 
Owners Insurance Company & Auto Owners Insurance Company's 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
In early May 2003, Stephen Kirchen via use of Auto Owners' computer rating 
program created a proposed premium rate for Farr's coverage. On May 13,2003, Kirchen 
provided the rate information to Auto Owners and underwriting informed him that final 
decision on the coverage was contingent upon home office approval and additional 
application information. 
On May 14,2003, Andrew Reed asked Dexter Farr to prepare a check for $7,838.83 
payable to Auto Owners for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage. Several 
days later, Kirchen received a call from Auto Owners' underwriting, informing him that the 
home office declined coverage on the Farr account. Farr's uncashed check made payable 
to Owners was returned to Farr. 
The basis for all of Farr's causes of action against Auto Owners is "Reed's 
Commitment—the claim that Andrew Reed, while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for 
Auto Owners, represented that Auto Owners had bound coverage for all of Farr's products 
and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint at If 21. 
Farr has no contractual relationship with Auto Owners. As a result, all of Farr's 
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causes of action against the defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship between 
Reed and Auto Owners under which Reed, as Auto Owners' agent, acted on behalf of and 
subject to Auto Owners' control. Despite Farr's theory, the record contains no evidence 
of an agency relationship between Auto Owners and Reed. In Utah, in order to be an 
agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behaif and subject to his 
control.'" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1989) {citing, 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Here, it is undisputed that Andrew Reed 
was not authorized to act on behalf of Auto Owners. In his deposition Reed specifically 
states that he was not an agent of Auto Owners and never had authority to represent the 
company. Andrew Reed Deposition, at 351-52. Absent evidence of an agency 
relationship, Farr's claims against Auto Owners for breach of contract, bad faith, 
negligence and estoppel must fail. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment against Auto Owners is 
denied, and defendant Auto Owners Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
F. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truck 
Insurance Exchange and Andrew Reed & Truck Insurance Exchange 
and Andrew Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment 
1. Truck Insurance Exchange/Farmers Insurance 
As with the other defendants, Farr asserts causes of action against Truck Insurance 
Exchange (Farmers InsurancefFarmers") for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and 
equitable estoppel. Distinguishing Farmers from the other primary defendants, however, 
is the fact that Andrew Reed was a captive agent of Farmers Insurance. As Farmers' 
agent, Farr claims that Reed represented that Farmers "duly bound and provided plaintiff 
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with all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of plaintiffs significant 
insurable risks." Third Amended Complaint IT 21, 
Despite the existence of an agency relationship between Farmers and Reed, it is 
undisputed that Farmers declined to write coverage for Farr's business, and that as early 
as May 23, 2003, Farr knew that Farmers declined coverage. Dexter Farr Deposition, at 
158-59. Thus, the agency relationship between Reed and Farmers was solely limited to 
Reed's attempt to place Farr's coverage with Farmers; once Farmers declined, Reed was 
no longer Farmer's agent and Farmers was not involved with Reed's attempts to secure 
coverage through other insurers . Thus, as to its contract based claims Farr admits it did 
not have a contract with Farmers and has not provided evidence of any acts to the 
contrary. Additionally, in support of its estoppel claim Farr has not provided any evidence 
of an admission, statement or act inconsistent with Farmers' declination of coverage prior 
to the accident. Finally, Farr's negligence claim also fails because plaintiff fails to establish 
any duty that Farmers' owed to Farr and did not fulfill. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truck Insurance 
Exchange/Farmers' Insurance is denied and Defendant Truck Insurance 
Exchange/Farmers' Insurance Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Andrew Reed 
Based upon Mr. Reed's active involvement with the Farr account, the parties' 
motions must be considered in somewhat different posture than the other defendants. 
Farr's cause of action for breach of contract against Reed is not, as in the case of 
Harris v Albrecht a case of whether a contract of insurance exists. 2004 UT 13. Instead, 
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the issue is whether the coverage obtained by Reed was sufficient to meet plaintiffs 
needs, or whether Reed contracted for adequate coverage of all significant insurable risks. 
Third Amended Complaint fl 27. Albrecht is, however, helpful insofar as it addresses 
basic contract principles relevant to insurance contracts, including the rule that an agent 
must have definite directions from the insured as to the type and amount of coverage 
needed in order to establish the requisite meeting of the minds. Albrecht at fl11 (finding, 
failure to procure insurance does not arise unless agent has "definite directions from the 
insured to consummate a final contract"). In the instant case the undisputed facts 
establish that Reed obtained a policy of insurance containing coverage similar to Farr's 
prior policy with Unitrin, and that Farr did not provide Reed with any specific direction to 
acquire additional coverage beyond that previous obtained. In fact to the contrary, the 
evidence reveals that Farr specifically rejected Reed's suggestion to increase Farr's 
inventory coverage. Dexter Farr Deposition at 102-103. A blanket request for adequate 
coverage and a specific rejection of increased spoilage coverage is inadequate to establish 
any contract or commitment on the part of Reed to unilaterally procure an insurance policy 
for Farr that contained coverage beyond their specifications. Thus, based upon the 
undisputed facts, there is no evidence to support a claim for breach of contract or bad faith 
since Reed performed his agreement with Farr and obtained a policy of insurance 
consistent with Farr's request. 
With respect to plaintiffs estoppel claim, there is no evidence in the record to show 
that Reed misrepresented the state of the Farr's insurance coverage. While Farr argues 
that Reed represented coverage was in place and failed to explain the terms of the policy, 
neither allegation amounts to a misrepresentation. First, the statement by Reed that 
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coverage was in place was undisputedly true; a policy was in place prior to the accident. 
Second, the Farr's failure to educate themselves as to the terms of their coverage does not 
amount to reasonable reliance. Absent any evidence supporting claims of 
misrepresentation or reasonable reliance, Farr's estoppel claim fails. 
Finally, as to the cause of action for negligence, Reed clearly had a duty to obtain 
insurance coverage consistent with the Farr's expressed request. Contrary to plaintiffs 
assertion, there was no breach of this duty since Reed, absent any specific instruction from 
Farr, obtained coverage consistent with the Farr's prior policy with Unitirin. There is no 
duty between Reed and Farr that requires Reed to insist on procuring a coverage limit 
greater than that which Farr requested. Additionally, with respect to plaintiff's argument 
that Reed had a duty to communicate the "coverage gap" to Farr, the record indicates that 
Reed did so when he suggested additional coverage. Dexter Farr Deposition at 102-103. 
The fact that plaintiff now claims it did not understand the differences in policy coverage 
does not negate the fact that Reed did communicate the idea of additional coverage. 
Nothing in the record supports Farr's argument that Reed misrepresented the state of 
coverage and the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no failure on the part of Farr to 
perform his duties as plaintiffs insurance agent. Accordingly, Farr's claim for negligence 
is denied. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Andrew Reed is 
denied and Andrew Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
G. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Trustco & 
Defendant Trustco's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Trustco's involvement in this matter stems from a May 23, 2003, letter signed by 
Duane Farr appointing Trustco as Farr's Broker of Record. In its capacity as Broker, 
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Trustco, by and through Troy Granger, placed Farr's coverage with American States; the 
policy in place at the time of the ammonia accident. 
Limiting the allegations against Trustco to those contained in the Third Amended 
Complaint, all causes of action against Trustco stem from "Reed's Commitmenf-the claim 
that Andrew Reed, while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Trustco, represented that 
Trustco bound coverage for all of Farr's products and insurable risks. Third Amended 
Complaint, a t ^ 2 1 . 
Similar to the other defendants, the Court concludes there is no evidence of an 
agency relationship between Reed and Trustco. In Utah, to be an agent a person "must 
be authorized by another to 'acton his behalf and subject to his control'" Gildea v Guardian 
Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998)(crt/ng, Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 1 (1958)). While Farr relies upon Reed's involvement in obtaining a signature 
for Trustco to act as Broker of Record letter and Reed's collection of a premium as 
evidence of an agency relationship, such evidence actually supports the existence of an 
agency relationship between Reed and Farr since it is undisputed that all information 
regarding Farr's insurance needs were communicated to Trustco by Reed. 
As to plaintiffs' contract based claims, the evidence reflects that Trustco fulfilled all 
of the terms of its agreement with Farr by serving as its broker of record and binding 
coverage with Safeco/American States effective May 23, 2003. Additionally, there is no 
evidence of an admission, statement or act inconsistent with Trustco's role as broker. 
Similarly, Farr's negligence claim also fails because there is no evidence that Trustco had 
a duty to determine whether the amount of coverage in the Safeco/American States policy 
was sufficient to meets plaintiffs needs. 
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For these reasons, Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment against 
Trustco is denied, and defendant Trustco's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
III. Conclusion 
In conclusion, plaintiff is unable to support its allegations against the defendants as 
stated in Farr's Third Amended Complaint. The absence of an agency relationship 
between Andrew Reed and the primary defendants negates the effect of any 
representations Reed allegedly made on the insurers' behalf. Moreover, as to Andrew 
Reed himself, the record indicates his suggestions to alter coverage from that established 
under Farr's prior policy was rejected and Reed has no duty to obtain coverage beyond 
that requested from the insured. 
This Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, granting and denying the motions 
as set forth herein, and no order is required to be prepared by counsel. 
Dated this / 5 ~ day of ^tff, 2007. 
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